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ABSTRACT

The Middle East, which is already plagued by a series of security threats–such as terrorism, religious conflict, political instability, and more–is also an increasingly water-scarce and climate-vulnerable region. In
this review, I examine the most recent and relevant literature on the debate of: how will, and how has climate
change affected security in the Middle East? I examine five articles and one book that tackle this question,
and I organize these sources based on the extent to which they argue that climate change is a determinant of
insecurity in the region. While a few authors argue that climate change has or has not played a large role in
the region’s insecurity, most authors argue that the debate is multi-faceted and complex, suggesting that climate change is just one of many factors–though still an important one–associated with instability in the region. I conclude this review with a series of gaps in the literature, as well as avenues for future research.

INTRODUCTION

a severe drought from 2006/7-2010 preceded an ongoing civil war
that began in 2011 (Kelley et al. 2015, 3241); this is most notably
In the last century, and especially in the past few decades, the globe a product of insufficient data from other examples and the intensity
has experienced growing effects of anthropogenic climate change, of the Syrian drought and civil war.
such as the greater increase in magnitude and frequency of extreme
weather events (Feitelson & Tubi 2017, 40). One notable impact I. To What Extent Does Climate Change Affect Insecurity in the Middle
that will most disproportionately affect the Middle East region East?
is the rise in water insecurity, including more frequent and more
intense droughts (Feitelson & Tubi 2017, 40). This region is also Of the sources examined, Kelley et al. (2015) take the most ambia widely securitized one–as it is home to several ongoing violent tious side of the debate; they argue that, in the Syrian example, “the
conflicts, democracy deficits, socioeconomic struggles, multiple drought had a catalytic effect, contributing to political unrest” that
threats of terrorism, and more (Swain & Jägerskog 2016, 1). Given resulted in the civil war (Kelley et al. 2015, 3241). In order to reach
the Middle East’s political and climate instability, it is crucial to this conclusion, the researchers developed and contributed to the litconsider: how will, and how has climate change affected security erature a robust set of statistical models of rainfall and other environin the Middle East? There exists–albeit limited–literature on this mental indicators in the region over time; from these models, they
debate, in which authors each add original value but all respond to ultimately demonstrate how the downward trend in rainfall mirrors
the question of: to what extent will and has climate change affected broader climate models on these impacts–showing how the drought
security in the Middle East? Therefore, I impose a comprehensive was provoked by anthropogenic causes (Kelley et al. 2015, 3245).
framework on the literature, which organizes the debate around They then connected the drought to the 1) large migration of people
whether climate change has played a major, intermediate, or little from Northeast Syria to urban centers during the drought period, 2)
role in implicating security in the region. Further, I weave in oth- increased stress on resources, and therefore 3) political unrest and
er relevant discussions within this broader debate and recommend conflict (Kelley et al. 2015, 3245). Kelley et al.’s (2015) study was
three key avenues for future research.
ground-breaking because of its provocative claims connecting anthropogenically-caused drought as a major contributor to the civil
war. Importantly, it also sparked a set of research that contributed difTHE DEBATE ON CLIMATE CHANGE & SECURITY IN THE MID- ferent viewpoints on the debate–including backlash in certain cases.
DLE EAST
The source that most directly contradicts Kelley et al.’s (2015) arThe five articles and one book examined in this review generally gument–arguing that climate change does not significantly implicover all of the major viewpoints on the debate regarding the extent cate security in the Syrian example–is the Selby et al paper. (2017).
to which climate change has and will affect security in the region. The authors dismantle and refute three claims that Kelley et al.
Specifically, the sources broadly argue that climate change is either (2015) support: 1) anthropogenic climate change contributed to the
a major contributor, an intermediate contributor or “threat multipli- pre-civil war drought in Syria; 2) the drought was responsible for
er,” or a minimal or indeterminate contributor, to insecurity. Fur- the migration of up to 1.5 million Syrians into urban centers in the
ther, many of the sources rely on the case study of Syria–in which country; and, 3) this migration contributed to the increasing presPublished by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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sures that initiated the civil war (Selby et al. 2017, 232). To refute
each claim, the researchers find and illustrate methodological flaws
in Kelley et al.’s (2015) models and analysis that disrupt the contingent impact chain upon which their claims rely. Selby et al. (2017)
have therefore contributed to the literature an eye-opening skepticism and refutation of the prominent discourse–that climate change
played any role in the onset of the civil war. They caution how researchers must, moving forward, “exercise far greater caution when
drawing such linkages or when securitising climate change” (Selby
et al. 2017, 232)–forcing scholars to rethink and reevaluate their
methods for examining these climate-conflict interactions. Given
the two extremes argued by Kelley et al. (2015) and Selby et al.
(2017), these researchers have left considerable space for a series
of various in-the-middle stances on this debate.
Many of the other sources–unlike Kelley et al. (2015) or Selby et al.
(2017)–promote an in-between stance, one that urges a multi-faceted, multi-layered, and nuanced approach to this debate. To begin
with, Gleick (2014) argues both that “water and climatic conditions
have played a direct role in the deterioration of Syria’s economic
conditions,” as well as that the severe drought was one of these
environmental conditions that had “subsequent effects on political
stability” (Gleick 2014, 331 & 338). Gleick (2014), unlike Kelley
et al. (2015) however, substantially points to other contributors to
the civil war, such as “long-standing political, religious, and social
ideological disputes” and “economic dislocations from both global
and regional factors’’ (Gleick 2014, 338). As Gleick’s article was
written before Kelley et al.’s (2015) and before the other sources
examined in this review, Gleick is the first to contribute to the literature such a nuanced examination of the role of climate change
in affecting security. This is because it displays the various aforementioned contributing factors that complicate the role of climate
change and drought as a driver of conflict. Furthermore, Gleick’s
focus on these multi-layered causes for worsened security, though
he supports the notion that the pre-civil war drought resulted from
climatic changes (Gleick 2014, 337), elucidates that he promotes
the notion that climate is an intermediate contributor to insecurity.
Feitelson & Tubi (2017) take an even more complex approach than
Gleick (2014) in arguing that climate change is an intermediate,
rather than directly dependent, variable in predicting insecurity and
conflict. Specifically, the authors argue that climate change only
contributed to the onset of conflict when other fundamental factors, such as adaptive capacity predicted by a state’s economic and
institutional structures, was compromised (Feitelson & Tubi 2017,
40). This argument is similar to Gleick’s (2014), but it crucially
argues the following distinction: the other contributory factors to
conflict–which both papers similarly attribute to various political, social, and economic instabilities–must be present in order
for climatic and environmental factors to contribute to the onset
of conflict. Feitelson & Tubi (2017) support their claims by contributing to the literature a framework that examines the various
mechanisms by which climate change can affect security and conflict. Their framework incorporates three key factors–geopolitical
settings (i.e. historical and ethnic contexts, water relations among
neighboring states, etc.), the physical settings (in this case, climate
change effects), and internal settings (i.e. economic and institutional structures, and adaptive capacity, of the state)–with which they
model various pathways that may result in the outcome of conflict
(Feitelson & Tubi 2017, 40-41). The researchers applied this comhttps://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/16
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plex framework to both the 2007-2010 drought’s impacts in the
Euphrates basin (shared by Syria, Turkey, and Iraq) and the Jordan River basin (managed by Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank
Palestinians); it was through this application, and the outcome of
no conflict in the Jordan River Basin amidst the drought, that the
researchers came to their conclusion (Feitelson & Tubi 2017, 4546). The comparison between these two basins was a unique and
valuable contribution, as the other examined sources did not attribute nearly as much–if any–attention to the drought’s impacts on
the Jordan River Basin.
Ide’s (2018) paper contributes less original argumentation because
it simply reviews the literature on the Syrian example; further, its
neutral/inconclusive stance on the role of climate change in affecting security in the Middle East leaves it in a ‘no man’s land’ in the
middle of this debate. Notably, Ide highlights the need for greater
evidence to argue that the drought contributed significantly to reduced livelihoods, or that this reduction in livelihood resulted in
widespread migration; he further emphasizes the inability to prove
that this migration, if drought-related, contributed to the onset of
civil war (Ide 2018, 352). In doing so, Ide’s framework–for how
climate change and drought may or may not have implicated the
onset of civil war in Syria–is very similar to that proposed by Selby
et al. (2017). Ide (2018) crucially ends with a presentation of the
main shortcomings that exist within the current literature, which I
further discuss later in this review.
Swain & Jägerskog’s (2016) book similarly does not produce strong
arguments or conclusions about the role of climate change in implicating conflict, but they suggest the role of climate change as a
“threat multiplier” to security–placing them in the middle of this debate as well. Further, the authors present a series of threats to the
region’s security that will be furthered by climate change, such as
water and food security, among others (Swain & Jägerskog 2016, 2930). Beyond individual examinations of the threats to these types of
security from climate change, the authors weave in how these threats
build upon other security risks endemic to the region, such as the
threats of terrorism, deficits in democracy, and complicated ethnic
and religious dynamics (Swain & Jägerskog 2016, 1). Their analysis
of different types of security is unique (and will be further discussed
in the following section of this review), as most of the other examined sources solely consider security in the form of conflict. As such,
the other sources failed to consider the various components of human
and individual security, such as food or water security on the individual level, that climate change may provoke or worsen.
II. Climate Change’s Impact on Security Before & During Conflict
Another, albeit smaller, question discussed in several of the sources
and worth considering within this broader framework and debate
is: what role does climate change play in affecting security in the
region at different periods in time, such as causing or preempting
insecurity, versus exacerbating already-onset insecurity?
To begin with, Kelley et al. (2015) and Selby et al. (2017) primarily
consider the role that climate change plays in instigating or contributing to the onset of insecurity in the form of conflict; whereas, they
do not explicitly consider or analyze how climate change may elongate or implicate the discourse of an ongoing conflict. Regardless,
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their conclusions imply that, had they considered the role of climate
change in affecting already-onset insecurity and/or conflict, Kelley
et al. (2015) would have been more likely than Selby et al. (2017)
to support that climate change has played a role in shaping the trajectory of conflict–like the Syrian Civil War. Second, Ide (2018)
also does not give much attention to the role of climate change in
affecting the discourse of conflict and insecurity after their onset;
this is not surprising, however, as Ide (2018) assesses a set of literature that primarily focuses on the causal linkage between climate
change and the onset of the Syrian civil war, rather than how climate change may have implicated the discourse of the war itself.
Meanwhile, the other three sources do in some capacity contribute
to the discussion on how climate change may affect the discourse,
rather than cause, insecurity–which again has been designated in
most of these sources as consistent with conflict. First, both Gleick (2014) and Swain & Jägerskog (2016) begin to tackle the issue
of water security in exacerbating conflict. Gleick (2014) notes the
strategic advantage of targeting water infrastructure and systems
during conflicts, as well as the use of water as a weapon in these
conflicts; through these distinctions, he discusses the role of the climate-related reduction in water security as an avenue for exacerbating existent conflicts (Gleick 2014, 331). Swain & Jägerskog (2016)
similarly address the role of water scarcity due to climate change
as exacerbating existent conflicts. For example, they point out the
Islamic State’s (IS) taking control over dams and water installations
in Northern Syria and Iraq that were previously trans-boundary systems, and they note how this threat has been “linked to broader
regional security politics” and “could foretell a catastrophe” if the
IS stops or decreases the flow and/or destroys the dams (Swain &
Jägerskog 2016, 76). Together, these two sources begin to tackle
the role of climate change in prolonging and/or exacerbating existent insecurity through the pathway of reduced water security.
Lastly, Feitelson & Tubi (2017) approach this question in a more
complex manner, but they uniquely present the reversibility of the
climate-conflict interactions discussed in this review and in much of
the literature. Specifically, the researchers examine the role of conflict in increasing a state’s vulnerability to climate change; they do so
by considering the use of water as a weapon in the Syrian example,
alike to Gleick (2014) and Swain & Jägerskog (2016), in order to
come to this conclusion that conflict may increase climate vulnerability and causes greater environmental degradation (Feitelson & Tubi
2017, 47). From this conclusion, they further warn that this may in
turn “contribute to the outbreak of violence or its worsening,” perpetuating a climate-conflict cycle (Feitelson & Tubi 2017, 47).
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
I. Expanding Data & Methods Robustness

a key avenue for future research is building upon and expanding the
current literature to better resolve this data problem. Specifically, researchers should strengthen and overlap their methods and engage in
dialogue across their methods. This first step will allow researchers
to paint a more comprehensive, accurate, and nuanced picture of how
climate change and security interact in the Middle East.

“While researchers should attempt to
improve the quality and quantity of
their data where possible, they can
better answer the question of how
climate change and security interact by
overlapping their methods.”
To begin with, and in part due to the less expansive nature of the literature on this question, many of the researchers have pursued different–and often imperfect–methodological approaches on a small pool
of data (notably the Syrian example), resulting in a wide variety of
conclusions. For example, Kelley et al. (2015) come to their conclusions through a series of statistical models–thus a more quantitative
approach, whereas Feitelson & Tubi (2017) take a strict qualitative
approach with the development of their framework, and Selby et al.
(2017) build their own models while also bolstering their analysis
by pointing out the weak ethnographic methods (like testimonies) in
support of the climate-conflict relationship. Beyond their already-different methods, these researchers often point out flaws in their colleagues’ analyses rather than draw upon the valuable merits and/or
conclusions across these different methods; for example, Selby et al.
(2017) spend a considerable effort disproving and pointing out the
flaws in Kelley et al.’s (2015) analysis (Selby et al. 2017, 235). As
there lacks consensus on the nature of the relationship between climate change and security in the region, however, it would be in the
best interest of future research to collaborate more effectively across
methods and overlap both quantitative and qualitative methods (Ide
2018, 352). Ide (2018) points out the importance of doing so, noting how “opportunities for fruitful and policy-relevant insights are
missed due to a lack of mutual acceptance between proponents of
various methods in the debate on drought and the civil war in Syria” (350). In sum, while researchers should attempt to improve the
quality and quantity of their data where possible–and while understanding the difficulty of doing so in certain conflict-ridden regions in
the Middle East, they can better answer the question of how climate
change and security interact by overlapping their methods and establishing a greater dialogue between each other.

II. Improving Theory Development and Engagement
While the literature covers a variety of methodologies and stances in
arguing how climate change affects security in the Middle East, there A second and related hole in this research is the lack of theoretical
are some key holes in this literature that should be used to shape fu- engagement. The field of climate change and security, let alone in
ture research; first, there is still much debate on the exact relationship the Middle East specifically, is a newer one with much that is unbetween climate change and security in the region. It appears that a known about the present and future, but also about how these two
major factor for this poor clarity and lack of consensus is the poor factors have interacted in the past. This is not surprising, as the
quantity and quality of the data available on this topic. As a result, effects of climate change–unlike other security threats, like nuclear
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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weapons–are still considered to be an “emerging threat” to security
(Swain & Jägerskog 2016). The sources examined in this review,
therefore, rely considerably on contemporary cases (like Syria) and
do not engage much theory related to how climate change interacts
with and affects security; this further complicates, along with the
diverse methods used, our understanding of how we might expect
or predict climate change to implicate security in the future. In fact,
Ide (2018) notes this flaw across the literature on Syria, noting how
the “lack of theoretical engagement impedes the ability to learn
from past debates or to inspire future discussions beyond the narrow question of whether drought contributed to the onset of civil
war in Syria or not” (352). Therefore, and while some of the researchers discussed in this review, such as Feitelson & Tubi (2017),
attempt to build a more theoretical framework, further research
should attempt to develop–potentially using current understandings
of security theory and what factors contribute to insecurity at the
human, domestic, and international levels of analysis–and engage
theory that attempts to detail the patterns through which climate
change affects security in the region.
III. Defining Different Components of Security

following question: how has and will climate change affect security in the Middle East? I examined six sources, structuring the debate through the question of: to what extent has and will climate
change affect security in the Middle East? I first organized the
sources into three categories, denoting whether they supported that
climate change played a major, intermediate, or minimal/no role in
affecting security in the region. Second, I considered an additional
layer to the research question, which was: what role does climate
change play in affecting security in the region at different periods
in time, such as causing or preempting insecurity versus exacerbating existent insecurity and/or conflict? This allowed me to more
fully discuss the relationships and arguments across the sources.
Third, I presented three prominent avenues for further research on
the topic of climate change and security in the Middle East, some of
which were drawn upon by suggestions from the sources examined;
these included: first, the need to expand data quality and quantity
where possible, improve the robustness of methods, and promote
cross-methods collaboration and dialogue; second, the need to improve theory development and engagement on this topic to better
tackle the past, present, and future of the climate-security nexus;
and, third, the need to research and define the nature of these this
nexus for different types of security, such as international, national,
and human security. Overall, there still exists much debate on the
ways through which climate change affects security in the Middle
East. However, these recommended avenues for further research
will allow researchers to develop more nuanced, cooperative, and
comprehensive conclusions on the subject; this will be crucial for
understanding the nature of security in the Middle East in the following decades, especially as climate change impacts increase in
magnitude and frequency.

A third and final key hole in the existing literature is the interchangeable
use of security and conflict. With the exception of Swain & Jägerskog
(2016), every other source either exclusively used the term “conflict”
when examining the topic at hand or appeared to refer to the terms
“conflict” and “security” interchangeably. Whereas, Swain & Jägerskog (2016) present a series of considerations for security, such as international, national, and human security; and, within the conversation
of human security, they refer to food security, water security, physical
security, and more (29-30). Because the term “security” broadly encompasses all of these levels of security, the current literature’s use of
the term interchangeably with conflict (or not at all) means that a whole ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
component of what that security entails has been neglected.
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